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opinion that the "authorization test" is the better and more
logical one, it seems that the result reached by the Penn-
sylvania court is correct. It is doubtful whether Adams
was impliedly authorized to use his car by the statement of
the superintendent. If this is true, then under the "author-
ization test" the master cannot be liable for the negligent
conduct of his servant when said servant uses an instrument-
ality without the authorization of said master. A fortiori
if the statement may be construed as implied authoriza-
tion, then under the "test" the master would be liable for
the servant's negligent use of the instrumentality.
Henry V. Scheirer
PLEAS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND AUTREFOIS
CONVICT OR ACQUIT
Although the purpose of the criminal law is to prevent
and punish offenses against the people, it also does much
to secure just treatment for the accused. Just as the civil
law protects a person from continuous persecution by one
who has an alleged claim against him, so the criminal law
provides that the state cannot repeatedly try a man for the
same offense. The weapons furnished to the accused in the
latter field of law are the pleas of double jeopardy and of
autrefois convict or autrefois acquit. In a general way
these pleas have much in common, but several distinct dif-
ferences exist in their origin and application.
The plea of double jeopardy arises from Article I, sec-
tion 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874. It is
there stated, "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." This provision has re-
mained the same throughout the various constitutions of
the state, and constructions thereof by the cases are equally
applicable regardless of the year in which they were
decided.
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The early case of Commonwealth v. Cook' formulated
certain general rules applicable to the provision, and these
same rules exist today. With the facts of this case in mind
the plea of double jeopardy can be more adequately dis-
cussed. This was a case of indictment for first degree
murder brought against three defendants. The jury agreed
as to the verdict to be rendered against two, but not as
against the third. The trial judge discharged the jury, re-
fusing to receive the verdicts that had been reached, so that
it was not known what the verdict was, nor against which
two it was directed. Subsequently Cook was re-indicted
for the same offense, and he entered a plea of double
jeopardy. Upon its denial in the lower court, the defendant
appealed to the Supreme Court where Chief Justice Tilgh-
man rendered the opinion in favor of the plea.
Jeopardy, in the meaning of the Constitution, comes into
existence when the jury is panelled and sworn, 2 and not
until then.3  Therefore, if the oath has not yet been admin-
istered, 4 or if a mere preliminary hearing is held, such as to
determine if the accused has been properly indicted by
name,5 no jeopardy results. The jeopardy involved is that
"of life or limb." From this phrase the courts have con-
cluded that this guarantee to accused persons is present
only in cases of capital offenses, for imprisonment does not
imperil life or limb.8 Therefore, as the situation exists to-
day, the plea of double jeopardy factually requires that there
has been an indictment for first degree murder, and that a
jury has been sworn and charged with the life of the de-
fendant. No prior actual conviction or acquittal is neces-
1Comm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577 (1822).
2Hilands v. Comm., 111 Pa. 1 (1885).
3Alexander v. Comm., 105 Pa. 1 (1884).
4McFadden v. Comm., 23 Pa. 12 (1853); Comm. v. Cury, 287 Pa.
557 (1926).
5Alexander v. Comm., 105 Pa. 1 (1884).
6McCreary v. Comm., 29 Pa. 323 (1857); Comm. v. Freedman, 94
Pa. Super. Ct. 491 (1928); Comm. v. Keeper of Phila. Co. Prison, 76
Pa. Super. Ct. 98 (1921).
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sary, and, as will be shown, the majority of controversies
over the plea have arisen upon the effect to be given to
the discharge of the jury.
Under the earlier English practice Lord Coke stated as
law that a jury could not be discharged in a capital case
until a verdict was reached although both the defense and
prosecution agreed to such discharge," The rule was with-
out foundation, and as settled in Kinlock's Case, Foster 22,
ceased to be so rigid, and a discharge is now allowed if it is
done for the defendant's benefit and he consents thereto, 9
or if a case of absolute necessity exists. What is absolute
necessity has usually been a question to be applied to the
facts of a particular case. It is well settled, however, that
such necessity exists (1) when there has been a tampering
by the defense with the jury or with a witness for the prose-
cution; (2) when the prisoner becomes insane after making
his plea or during the trial; (3) and when a juryman be-
comes incompetent to serve.10
From the above summary of rules as to absolute
necessity it can readily be surmised that mere disagreement
is not sufficient to warrant a discharge of the jury without
the defendant's consent; and this is the law." The reason
lies in the fact that a disagreement is an advantage that can-
not be taken from the prisoner without his consent. Furth-
er, if a jury could be so discharged it would lead to few
verdicts in capital cases, and give non-believers in capital
punishment a way out of their difficulty when called to serve
as jurors.' 2
It is at this point that the plea of double jeopardy be-
comes effective. As is said in McFadden v. Common-
7Comm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577 (1822); Comm. v. Fitzpatrick, 121
Pa. 109 (1888).
81 Inst. 227 b; 3 Inst. 110.
9Comm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577 (1822).
lOComm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577 (1822); McFadden v. Comm., 23
Pa. 12 (1853); Comm. v, Fitzpatrick, 121 Pa. 109 (1888),
"'Hilands v. Comm., 23 Pa. 1 (1885); Comm. v. Cook, 6 S. & R. 577
(1822).
22Comm, v. Cook, 6 S. 6 R. 577 (1822).
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wealth,"3 "discharge of jury in a capital case, after the trial
has begun, is not a continuation of the cause. It is the end
of it. And for all purposes of future protection it is the
same to the prisoner as an acquittal, unless it was done with
his consent, or demanded by some overwhelming neces-
sity."" The use of the word "acquittal" here is somewhat
misleading, for as has been shown above, no actual acquit-
tal is necessary. Also, an unlawful discharge is only ef-
fective as to the allegements set forth in the indictment. In
Hilands u. Commonwealth,15 there was an indictment for
murder and the jury was panelled and sworn. During the
course of the trial the jury was separated over night with
the consent of both the prosecution and defense. However,
the judge considered this as an irregularity and discharged
the jury without the defendant's consent. A new jury was
panelled and sworn and the defendant pleaded double
jeopardy. The plea was sustained by the Supreme Court,
but the case was then remanded to the trial court for
further action. That is, the plea of double jeopardy only
extended to the indictment for murder, but would be no de-
fense to an indictment for involuntary manslaughter16
Two rather obvious rules are still to be noted. First,
a plea of double jeopardy will only avail when the defend-
ant has twice been put in peril for the same offense. Thus,
if there is indictment for murder of two persons, a verdict
on one indictment will not be a bar to trial on the other.17
Second, a plea of double jeopardy will not be allowed if
the first trial was discontinued due to request for new trial
by the defendant, or upon order of the court to protect the
accused from prejudicial circumstances which have arisen."8
Pleas of autrefois convict or autrefois acquit are not
creations of statutes or constitutions, but come from the
1823 Pa. 12 (1853).
14Hilands v. Comm., III Pa. 1 (1885); Comm. v. Fitzpatrick, 121
Pa. 109 (1888).
'5111 Pa. 1 (1885).
'6 Comm. v. Greevy, 271 Pa. 95 (1921).
17Comm. v. Vallota, 279 Pa. 84 (1924).
18Comm. v. Lutz, 200 Pa. 226 (1901); Comm. v. Gabor, 209 Pa.
201 (1904).
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common law. In Pennsylvania they are recognized by legis-
lative enactment, but the only purpose thereof was to set
forth the manner in which the defense may be pleaded.19
When an analogy is drawn between these pleas in criminal
practice and that of res. judicata in the field of civil law, a
basic requirement is distinctly shown; i. e., a plea of this
defense requires that a verdict has been rendered in a form-
er trial, and mere jeopardy is insufficient.20 It must be
noted that a discharge of the jury without reasonable neces-
sity operates as a verdict of acquittal. By way of illustra-
tion, a failure of the jury to agree is reasonable necessity,
but an inability of the prosecution to prove the facts stated
in the indictment is not. 21 The advantage of autrefois pleas
over that of double jeopardy lies in the fact that the form-
er may be used as a defense to indictments for less than
capital, as well as capital, offenses.
22
The reason for allowing autrefois pleas are obvious,
but a quotation from the case of Commonwealth v. GreeVy
2 3
is worthy of note on the point:-"The jury system would
become as nothing if in the administration of the criminal law,
officers of the government were permitted time and again to
bring a man to trial for the same alleged unlawful act, after
a jury had upon a fair trial found him not guilty of the fact
upon which all of the indictments depended. If the gov-
ernment could try a man a second time after one jury had
found a fact in his favor, then there can be no limit to the
number of times he may be brought to trial." The consti-
tution provides that "trial by jury should be as heretofore,
and the right thereof shall remain inviolate.' '24 This also
191860 P. L. 437, sec. 30.
2OComm. v. Freedman, 94 Pa. Super. Ct. 491 (1928).
21CoMM. v. Hetrick, I Woodward 288 (1866); McCreary v. Comm.,
29 Pa. 323 (1857); Comm. v. Keeper of Phila. Co. Prison, 76 Pa. Super.
Ct. 98 (1921).
2 2Comm. v. Markowitz, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 231 (1920); Comm. v.
Greevy, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 116 (1920)-reversed on other grounds 271
Pa. 95; Altenburg v. Comm., 126 Pa. 602 (1889); Comm. v. Mc. Evans,
92 Pa. Super. Ct. 124 (1927).
2375 Pa. Super. Ct. 116 (1920).
24A.rt. I, sec. 6, Constitution of 1874.
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means that the accused is entitled to "the fruits of the jury
trial," and on this, bases his plea of autrefois convict or
acquit.
The factual requirements of such pleas are (1) matter
of record,-indictment, acquittal or conviction, and justices
before whom the trial was held; and (2) matter of fact,-
that defendant is the same person who was previously
acquitted or convicted on the same facts now alleged.2  As
stated in Commonwealth v. Forney,26 "The test in the plea
of autrefois acquit is whether the evidence necessary to sup-
port the second indictment would have been sufficient to
convict on the first. A former acquittal (or conviction) is
only a bar when the defendant could have been convicted
on the first indictment of the charge preferred in the sec-
ond." Therefore, if certain facts have been passed upon
and decided in a previous trial, the state cannot later at-
tempt to prove these facts against the defendant, even
though the second indictment is for an entirely different
offense than was alleged in the first.
2 7
It is interesting to note that in the cases of Common.
wealth v. Arner,28 and Commonwealth v. Wible29 the courts
erroneously used the term "double jeopardy" for pleas
which actually were of autrefois convict. These were both
cases of indictment for fornication and bastardy, and rape.
In one case there was a plea of guilty, and in the other, con-
viction of the former offense. Upon later indictments for
rape, pleas of double jeopardy were entered and sustained
-these decisions being contrary to the line of authority
previously discussed, which holds that a plea of double
jeopardy will only avail in capital cases. The Wible case
claims that there is an analogous plea in the cases of lesser
25Comm. v. Greevy, 75 Pa. Super. Ct. 116 (1920).
2687 Pa. Super. Ct. 451 (1926).
27Altenburg v. Comm., 126 Pa. 602 (1889); Comm. v. Altland, 79
Pa. Super. Ct. 43 (1922); Comm. v. Mc. Evans, 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 124
(1927).
28149 Pa. 35 (1892).
292 D. and C. 467 (1922).
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crimes, but to speak of unnecessary analogies in the face of
distinct differences is a dangerous practice.
What, then, are the differences which exist between the
plea of double jeopardy, and the plea of autrefois convict
or acquit? A review of the cases cited leads to the fol-
lowing conclusions:-1. The plea of double jeopardy orig-
inates from Constitutional provisions, while autrefois pleas
find their source in the common law.
2. The plea of double jeopardy is only available in
capital cases, while autrefois pleas are accessible under in-
dictment for any crime.
3. Autrefois pleas require that there shall have been
a verdict, an accepted plea of guilty, or a discharge of the
jury without reasonable necessity. The plea of double
jeopardy is available though no verdict has been given, if
there was discharge of the jury without absolute necessity.
E. F. Hann, Jr.
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
CONSIDERATION
The recent case of Langer v. Superior Steel Corpora-
tion" presents the question of promissory estoppel in Penn-
sylvania as a substitute for consideration.
The defendant sent the plaintiff the following letter:
"Aug., 31, 1927.
"Mr. Win. F. Langer,
"Dear Sir:
"As you are retiring from active duty with this com-
pany, as superintendent of the Annealing Department, on
August 31, we hope that it will give you some pleasure to
receive this official letter of commendation for your long and
faithful service with the Superior Steel Corporation.
1161 At. 571 (1932).
